Study on the Tripartite Game in Quality Regulation of Green Products
In quality regulation of green products, the government takes the quality of green products as the goal, the third-party certification institution and enterprise hope to use the existing resources to obtain the maximum benefits. Under asymmetric information, the third-party certification institution and enterprise is prone to adopt rent-seeking. Government seeking an effective solution to the problem is an important prerequisite to protect the quality of green products. Considering the participation jointly of quality regulation behavior strategy can provide the basis for the development of regulatory countermeasures in line with the actual situation. Firstly, this paper gives the respective duties of the government, the enterprise and the third-party. Government regulates the enterprise production behavior;the third party after obtaining the certification supervises the enterprise, and then is to be regulated by the government. Based on this, the conceptual model is constructed to analyze the internal mechanism among the government, third-party and enterprise. Secondly, the game models of the third party and enterprise, the government and third-party, the government and enterprise are built, which study the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium. Then the key factors of the government regulation or not regulation, the enterprise rent-seeking or not rent-seeking, the third-party accept rent-seeking or refuse to rent-seeking behavior strategies are analyzed. Again, the discussion is focused on the tripartite game in the rent-seeking, which elaborated the strategy behaviors of government, the third party and enterprise. The results show that the rent-seeking behavior of green products is related with the regulatory capacity coefficient,the regulation cost of the government and the penalties on the third-party and enterprise. Reducing the cost of government regulation, improving the regulatory capacity, and increasing financial penalties of the third-party and enterprise can effectively prevent the rent-seeking between them. In terms of improving the regulation efficiency of government,there are two cases. When placing the interests of the third-party in the first place, the government should reduce the additional economic seeking benefits of the third-party, improve the capacity of regulation, and increase financial penalties rent-seeking behavior of the third-party; when placing the interests of enterprise in the first place, the government should not only enhance the cost of rent-seeking, but also increase the financial penalties for illegal enterprise. Finally the recommendations are put forward for the governments including to strengthening the regulation capacity of green products, properly handling the demands of the game of the parties, and avoiding the third party and the enterprise rent-seeking.